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Abstract
Recently, both sociology of science and policy research have shown
increased interest in scientific uncertainty. To contribute to these debates
and create an empirical measure of scientific uncertainty, we inductively
devised two systems of classification or ontologies to describe scientific
uncertainty in a large corpus of food safety risk assessments with the help of
machine learning (ML). We ask three questions: (1) Can we use ML to assist
with coding complex documents such as food safety risk assessments on a
difficult topic like scientific uncertainty? (2) Can we assess using ML the
quality of the ontologies we devised? (3) And, finally, does the quality of our
ontologies depend on social factors? We found that ML can do surprisingly
well in its simplest form identifying complex meanings, and it does not benefit
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from adding certain types of complexity to the analysis. Our ML experiments
show that in one ontology which is a simple typology, against expectations,
semantic opposites attract each other and support the taxonomic structure
of the other. And finally, we found some evidence that institutional factors do
influence how well our taxonomy of uncertainty performs, but its ability to
capture meaning does not vary greatly across the time, institutional context,
and cultures we investigated.
Keywords
scientific uncertainty, content analysis, machine learning, ontology, food
safety
With the growing availability of digitized, unstructured textual information,
social scientists are looking for new ways to analyze content. There are two
problems that need to be solved simultaneously: how to create a new system
of classification and, once we have such a system, how to sort text correctly
into those categories (Bail 2014; DiMaggio 2015; Wagner-Pacific, Mohr,
and Breiger 2015). The first problem is the problem of induction, the second
is the problem of sorting. In this article, we are going to present a project
classifying scientific texts on food safety, where our focus is scientific uncer-
tainty expressed by the expert authors of those documents. Our ultimate
substantive goal is to contribute to an empirical foundation for the study of
uncertainty and ignorance in science. In this article, we offer a general
methodology of coding large corpora of text through the cooperation of
humans and machines. We show in a nontechnical way that machine learning
(ML) can be a robust and useful aid in building and using classification
schemes, we call ontologies. Yet, we emphasize that method cannot be
divorced from content. Using ML is no substitute for human understanding
of the nature of the text corpus to be analyzed. The analysis must be guided
by the nature of the question asked and the kind of text available. In our
version, ML does not negate but enhances qualitative approaches.
Induction and Sorting
There are two approaches that developed in recent literature to sorting texts
with the help of computers. Both, in different ways, combine human knowl-
edge with machine algorithms. One is based on machines processing and
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classifying text on the basis of certain algorithms, the other works through a
more explicit cooperation of humans and machines (Grimmer and Stewart
2013; Jain, Duin, and Mao 2000). The first, called “unsupervised” learning,
does not start with a set of categories or an ontology. It is an exploratory
method that constructs the ontology in an inductive manner by generating
groupings of similar texts (Aggarwal and Zhai 2012:77-128; Grimmer and
King 2010). It uses the relative frequency of words and combination of words
to create those clusters. Topic modeling extracts multiple themes from doc-
uments sorting them into multiple categories (Blei 2012). However, despite
its autonomy in induction, the unsupervised method cannot bypass human
input either. Humans must select and prepare the text for analysis, but more
importantly, unsupervised methods rely very heavily on human input on the
back end. The meaning of the clusters requires human interpretation and the
interpretation needs validation. Do the results emerging from the ontology
predict outcomes outside the world of the text corpus that it ought to? For
instance, can we map changes in the relative frequencies of various cate-
gories generated by the unsupervised process onto a flow of events in a
meaningful fashion (as in DiMaggio, Nag, and Blei 2013)? Prediction
validates meaning, and unsupervised methods depend on smart tests to
persuade us to accept a certain interpretation of the meaning of its findings
especially if those are not trivial (Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Jelveh,
Kogut, and Naidu 2015).
Supervised methods, our focus here, on the other hand are used to sort
cases into categories created by humans (Hillard, Purpura, and Wilkinson
2007; Nardulli, Althaus, and Hayes 2015). In this methodology, after selecting
the corpus, one begins with an ontology or coding scheme produced or adopted
by the researcher, one that is backed up by human reasoning, and then the
machine is trained to reproduce the choices the coders would make if they
were to work correctly, consistently following the inherent logic of the system.
Supervised methods require heavier human input at the front end in the
form of a coding scheme, a set of categories and then humans must hand-sort
some text. Then, the task of the machine is simply to scale up the human
effort and sort much more text that humans possibly can or help the human
coders with suggestions speeding up the process. The machine at its best does
as well as the best human coder. In supervised learning, the machine is the
student, and humans are its teachers.
In our research on scientific uncertainty, we (humans) devised two
ontologies or classification systems, hand-coded texts using these coding
schemes, and then used supervised learning to teach machines to find texts
that conform to those systems of classification. At the same time, it was not
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just the machine that learned to mimic our ontology, but we used the
machine’s learning process to find out about our own coding scheme. In
other words, we used ML to interrogate our ontology and assist us with
checking our induction.
Unsupervised methods have proved to be impractical in our research
because of the nature of the question we wanted to ask and the kind of
documents we were working with. We were interested in uncertainty, which
was only one, limited aspect of these documents. Moreover, risk assessments
are not primarily about uncertainty. They are about the food risks, the sci-
entific research, and evidence available about them, and ultimately, they
need to establish the amount of the contaminant or the biohazard that can
be ingested without falling ill and the ways of avoiding exposure above a
certain level. Two documents on the same or similar hazards may seem very
similar to any unsupervised algorithm, but they may be very different in
terms of how much and what kind of uncertainty they express. Had these
texts been only about uncertainty on a topic, or had each document included a
special section devoted exclusively to uncertainties, a section that we could
have easily detached and analyzed separately, unsupervised methods might
have brought some interesting results.
Ontology, Coding Scheme, and Sorting
This article traverses various fields each with its own language and voca-
bulary. While we use terms like coding schemes from the sociological
tradition of content analysis (Krippendorff 2013), we borrow the word
ontology from computer science (Staab and Studer 2009). Ontology is “an
explicit specification of a conceptualization” (Gruber 1993:199), and it is
domain-specific.1 In full-fledged ontologies, concepts and their relation-
ships in a particular domain (e.g., scientific uncertainty) are organized in a
system that is an abstract representation of a world with a certain purpose
and at a specific level of granularity. Ontologies are powerful because they
can clarify and—to some degree—automate various cognitive processes
that manipulate meaning (Madsen and Thomsen 2004). Ontologies are
also meant to be portable and accommodate a wide range of contexts
and users.2
Ontologies as classification systems are used as coding schemes. We will
use these terms interchangeably, but the word ontology forces us to think
about our categories as interrelated and connected often in very intricate
ways. Ontologies can depict complex relationships among their concepts;
at other times, ontologies are not more than a few bins to sort things into, the
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former often referred to as heavy and the latter as lightweight ontology
(Go´mez-Pe´rez, Ferna´ndez-Lo´pez, and Corcho 2004:8). In this article, we
will offer two ontologies: One is very simple even for a lightweight ontology,
5 categories with little structure which organize expressions of scientific
uncertainty along five dimensions, and one that is larger and hierarchical
and sorts uncertainty statements into 27 categories arranged in a tree struc-
ture. We call the first one a typology and the second a taxonomy.
The Problem of Scientific Uncertainty in Food
Safety Science
Scientific uncertainty is both a theoretical problem and, as science has been
employed in regulatory decisions, a critical policy issue. In sociology of
science, sociological study of the relationship between knowledge and uncer-
tainty goes back at least to the work of Robert Merton (1957:417) who
wanted to understand the role of ignorance in the construction of scientific
knowledge. Recently, a large literature emerged on ignorance (Frickel and
Vincent 2007; Gross and McGoey 2015; Merton 1987; Smithson 1989),
issues of uncertainty (Gillund et al. 2008; Winkler 1996), negative knowl-
edge (Cetina 1999), nonknowledge (Bo¨schen et al. 2006, 2010; Kaempner
et al. 2011), nescience (Croissant 2014; Gaudet 2013; Gross 2007, 2012),
constituting a small subfield called agnotology (Proctor and Schiebinger
2008). This literature focused on how ignorance is constructed as opposed
to exist as “state of nature,” simply as lack of knowledge, either is highly
conceptual or builds on qualitative case studies, and our contribution here is
to devise a measurement of uncertainty in one particular context.
Scientific uncertainty as a general concept is a critical issue in the realm of
policymaking as well. From the effects of smoking and the necessity of
immunization campaigns to the causes of global warming, the certainty of
scientific knowledge has been the focus of vigorous debate for policymakers
and other public and private stakeholders. In food safety science, concerns
about the certainty of scientific knowledge became amplified in the 1990s, in
the wake of the food safety crisis created by bovine spongiform encephalo-
pathy (BSE), commonly known as “mad cow disease.” This debacle involved
British scientists, who for a while misrepresented the certainty of what then
was known about the relationship between BSE infecting cattle and the
Creutzfeldt–Jacob disease afflicting humans (Phillips, Bridgeman, and
Ferguson-Smith 2000; Millstone and van Zwanenberg 2001; van Zwanen-
berg and Millstone 2005). As a result, various international agencies began to
emphasize the importance of expressing scientific uncertainty in food safety
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risk assessment documents. Some, like World Health Organization (WHO),
the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the U.S. Environment Protec-
tion Agency (U.S. EPA), and the U.S. Office of Management and Budget
(U.S. OMB), issued guidelines working toward a system that both identifies
the type of uncertainty scientist perceive and the extent to which our knowl-
edge is uncertain in a particular respect (EFSA 2006; U.S. EPA 1993, 2000;
U.S. OMB 2006; WHO 2008). These agencies recognized that their decision
makers have to understand the nature of the weakness in the evidence that the
experts present and must have a clear sense of howmuch confidence they can
place in various scientific findings in order to take the best decision. Scholars
studying science itself also took up the issue of scientific uncertainty and
formulated various normative frameworks to guide experts in future risk
assessment reports. So far, none of these frameworks were adopted system-
atically by scientific panels.
Our approach to scientific uncertainty is not normative but empirical and
comparative. We want to describe, measure, and understand how scientists
express uncertainty in scientific reports assessing food risk. In our larger
project, we look at English language risk assessment documents produced
for food safety regulators in the United States and the European Union (EU)
between 2000 and 2010. We investigate two main, distinct areas of food
hazards in the food risk field: contaminants and biohazards.3 As the two
fields draw on different subdisciplines, they differ in the way they make use
of various scientific methodologies (experiments, observational studies, sta-
tistical analyses, analytic modeling, etc.) and thus may have different under-
standings of scientific uncertainties.
The documents were coded independently by two human experts, recon-
ciling disagreements by a third, and then we tested these ontologies using
ML. Our main objective was to answer three questions: (1) Can we use ML to
assist with coding complex documents such as food safety risk assessments
on a difficult topic like scientific uncertainty? Is ML doing a reasonable job
overall in coding sentences? (2) Can we assess using ML the quality of the
ontologies we devised? If ML is doing a reasonable job coding sentences, can
we test various logical and semantic properties of our ontologies? (3) And,
finally, does the quality of our ontologies depend on social factors? Is per-
formance of our ontologies related to external, social forces such as institu-
tional learning, institutions, and culture?
In the rest of the article, we first describe the two ontologies and our data.4
Then, we explain the use of ML and the choices we made to conduct our
experiments. We pose the three sets of questions, state some simple proposi-
tions, and discuss the empirical results.
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The Two Ontologies
To map scientific uncertainty, we developed two complementary ontologies
in an inductive and iterative process. We set out to develop a conceptualiza-
tion of uncertainty in scientific documents, to identify textual expressions of
uncertainty, and then to sort and analyze documents according to the amount
and type of uncertainty they voice.
We began with the general literature on scientific uncertainty. We tried
to adapt these categories to the documents. In the process, categories dis-
appeared, others got consolidated, and new ones emerged. In the end, we
constructed two systems of classification or ontologies. The first, a simpler
ontology, is designed to capture the nature of the judgment the scientists
make about the uncertainty of their conclusion about the state of knowledge
on a particular food hazard. This multidimensional typology classifies the
experts’ judgment of the evidence and focuses on their way of expressing
their state of mind. The second, a hierarchical system, gauges the content of
uncertainty they communicate. The categories identify the problems that
give rise to uncertainty about our current state of knowledge as perceived
by the authors. It is a taxonomy because the categories are arranged in a
genealogical hierarchy, where “ancestry” can be seen as higher levels of
generality.
For both ontologies, our context unit is the entire document (the coders
read the entire report to fully understand the conclusion), and the coding or
recording unit is the sentence or a few related, consecutive sentences
forming a passage expressing a particular type of uncertainty (our data
point). One sentence or passage can contain multiple expressions of uncer-
tainty and can be sorted into multiple categories.5 We also refer to cate-
gories as “variables” because their values vary from sentence to sentence.6
Consequently, we talk about judgment variables (JVs) and uncertainty
variables (UVs) when we talk about categories of the first and the second
ontology.
The scientific documents were official reports ordered by the main federal
food safety agencies in the EU (EFSA) and in the United States (U.S. FDA,
USDA, and U.S. EPA). As we were interested in the final verdict of the
experts, just as policymakers are, we coded only summaries and conclusions
of each document to capture the uncertainties that the experts thought
remained after they reviewed the available research on the topic. In a few
documents, there was a special section devoted exclusively to uncertainty.
There we coded that section as well.
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Judgment Typology
Our first ontology was designed to capture various aspects of the judgment of
the experts in their conclusions. It describes how the panel judges the weight
of the evidence, and it follows more closely the language they use to do so.
This ontology consists of five categories. They are conceptually distinct.
Three of them express uncertainty (hedging, precaution, and disagreement)
and two (confidence and expert assumption) communicate the opposite.
Hedging is a way of indicating that experts have doubt about or a lack of
total commitment to a proposition they present. Hedging, a way of making
things fuzzier (Lakoff 1972),7 expresses a “lack of complete commitment to
the truth value of an accompanying proposition” (Hyland 1996:1). It suggests
that the speaker is not committed entirely to a proposition because he or she
is uncertain about the truth of its content. The hedge signals this uncertainty
without laying out its causes in detail there, in that sentence, albeit the causes
may be explained elsewhere in the text.8 Hedging ill serves risk managers
because it makes the topic of interest less clear. To identify hedging, we ask
the question: “Can the proposition be restated in such a way that it is not
changed but that the author’s commitment to it is greater than at present? If
yes, then the proposition is hedged.” (Crompton 1997:281). For instance,
dropping “likely to be” in the sentence: “The . . . panel concluded that . . . the
risk is likely to be conservative . . . ” would make it more definite.
Our second category is confidence. Here we wanted to capture the oppo-
site of uncertainty, an emphatic commitment to a proposition. Often referred
to as boosters, expressions of certainty, assurance, and conviction expres-
sions of confidence provide a crucial clue for risk managers (Myers 1989;
Va´zquez and Giner 2009) and play an important role in persuasion in risk
assessments. They stress finality and absence of doubt. While there are many
words that are commonly used as boosters (e.g., undoubtedly, clearly, well
known, demonstrate, and proven), whether they express confidence in the
relevant scientific knowledge can be judged only from the wider context.
Experts, for instance, can be confident that no good data are available on a
topic or report and that it was demonstrated that the statistical models cannot
answer the crucial question. They are confident about their own assessment
of the evidence but not the strength of the evidence to settle an issue. In such
cases, there is uncertainty, and confidence is to emphasize that it is there.
Our third category is labeled expert assumption. This is another form of
confidence. The expert is aware that studies or models make certain assump-
tions about the world. These assumptions are not directly supported by
evidence, but according to the expert, this does not pose any problem. These
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are the best assumptions an expert can make or, at least, these are not
assumptions that the report questions.
We coded precaution as our fourth variable. Precaution is a way of deal-
ing with uncertainty. Making conservative assumptions or building conclu-
sions around “worst-case scenarios” is a way of creating certainty where data
and models fail to provide it. There is a large literature on the precautionary
principle in food safety and the presumed differences in precaution between
the EU and the United States that developed mostly in the context of geneti-
cally modified organisms (Hammitt et al. 2005; Lynch and Vogel 2001).
Our final category is disagreement. Disagreement is a staple of science,
but here we are interested in only disagreements that the report treats as
unresolved. This happens either when experts on the panel find unanimously
that contradicting evidence on the topic is equally strong or when the panel
splits, and some members disagree with others and voice dissent.
Uncertainty Taxonomy: An Ontology Based on the Source
of Uncertainty
To build our second ontology focusing on content of uncertainty, we began
with the general literature on scientific uncertainty (Hattis and Burmaster
1994; Morgan and Henrion 1990; Pate-Cornell 1996; van Asslet and Rot-
mans 2002; van der Sluijs et al. 2005; Walker et al. 2003) and papers addres-
sing uncertainties in the different disciplines involved in the food risk
assessment process such as epidemiology, microbiology, toxicology, and
exposure assessment (Dorne and Renwick 2005; Grandjean and Budtz-
Jorgensen 2007; Kang, Kodell, and Chen 2000; Kroes et al. 2002; Nautta
2000). Beside this literature, we drew upon two main institutional docu-
ments: the opinion of the Scientific Committee of EFSA (2006) entitled
uncertainties in dietary exposure assessment and the WHO draft guidance
document on characterizing and communicating uncertainty in exposure
assessment (WHO 2008). We simplified and adapted the basic structure of
these classification systems through a series of test coding of European, U.S.,
and international food safety risk assessments arriving at a 28-item hierarch-
ical ontology defined by a decision tree. As one moves down the tree, one
gets to more specific content. The coder had to code at the most specific
(lowest) level possible. Here we follow a basic insight by Merton that uncer-
tainty in science involves the process of moving from unspecified to spec-
ified ignorance (Einstein and Infield 1936; Merton, 1957, 1987; see also
Popper [1934] 1959).
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The tree was a decision tool to aid our coders. Sentences coded at
branches, rather than leafs or terminal nodes (at the right column in Figure
1 or the light-blue label in Figure 3), were unspecified at a lower level.
Coding sentences for content that can be quite complex raises the problem
of context much more so than the categories of our first ontology. The
meaning of sentences is often influenced by text that is not adjacent. Com-
prehending the source of a particular uncertainty often required following a
long exposition in the body of the report that the coder read but did not code.
In fact, while we annotated sentences, here it would be more accurate to say
that we were classifying the entire document and flagged the sentences (or
passages) that provided the best clue.
Our ontology begins with the common, philosophical distinction between
epistemic and ontic uncertainty (also known as natural variability). Episte-
mic uncertainty is the kind that points to missing or incomplete information.
Ontic uncertainty is the inherent, random variation among cases that no
further research can reduce. Epistemic uncertainty then is divided into prob-
lems that relate to data and those that relate to the model that we use to
understand data. Each, in turn, is subdivided into lower level, more specific
categories.
Data problem can be that some specific data (factors/variables) are simply
missing. This is, however, rarely where the report stops. In the absence of
good data, it reaches for surrogate data that are not exactly what we want but
with some inference are useful or data we want but measured imperfectly.
Surrogate data can be inadequate because we have the wrong population, the
wrong context, the wrong hazard, or an imperfect sample. Measurement can
be faulty because the measurement was taken incorrectly, it was not properly
reported, or reported in a way that creates problems of comparison.
For models, we distinguish between causal and other, formalized models.
Causal inference problems are further specified.
This ontology is built as a hierarchy from the most general down to the
more specific, but another way of thinking of this tree structure is that the
categories are organized in groups of similar content, whereby “children” of
the same “parent” show more family resemblance than “children” of differ-
ent “parents” or “grandparents.”
Data (The Documents)
The corpora of text we coded were 115 official risk assessment documents
produced by the EFSA in Europe, and the three U.S. federal agencies pri-
marily responsible for food safety across the Atlantic, U.S. FDA, USDA, and
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Figure 1. Decision Tree for Uncertainty Taxonomy Coding.
Is it uncertainty 
that is 
irreducible? 
OR 
Is it uncertainty 
that new 
information
can resolve? 
Ontic Uncertainty/Variablity 
Epistemic  
Uncertainty 
Is it due to the 
way the model 
is built? 
OR 
Is it due to the 
absence of 
good data 
about the 
hazard? 
Model 
Is it due to 
arbitrary model 
assumptions  
OR 
Is it due to some 
problem in our 
causal
understanding 
i.e. what 
generates the 
hazard? 
Arbitrary assumptions of model 
   Causal inference 
Is uncertainty due to ignoring synergism?   
OR 
Is it due to the inability to separate the effects of 
related causes?  
Combination effects 
  Correlated causal    
factors 
    Data 
Is it due to the 
complete 
absence of 
data?
OR 
Is it due to the 
lack of the exact 
kind of data we 
need and the 
fact that we 
have to use 
proxies 
(surrogates)?   
OR 
If we have the 
right kind of 
data, does some 
quality of the 
data create 
uncertainty?  
Missing factor 
Measurement 
Is it due to data from  
different sources are 
incomparable and point in 
different directions?  
OR 
Was measurement not 
reported well to know enough 
and trust the data?
OR  
Is it due to how it is 
measured?  
Comparability of data 
Reporting 
Measure 
Was the measurement 
poorly done?  
OR 
Does the methodology 
used in measuring have 
inevitable
limitations?
Flawed measure 
Limited analytic 
method 
Surrogate Data 
Is it a sampling problem?  
OR 
Is there a discrepancy 
between the hazard we 
have data for and the 
hazard of interest? 
OR 
Is there a discrepancy due 
to context?
OR  
Is there a discrepancy 
between the population of 
interest and the 
population we have 
information on?  
Sampling 
Was the sample too 
small?  
OR 
Was it selected 
improperly?  
Small sample size /few 
samples 
Non-representative 
sample 
Surrogate hazard 
Surrogate context 
Are the data from wrong  
temporal context? 
OR
 Causal context? 
OR
Magnitude? 
OR
In vitro not in vivo? 
Inference in time 
Scenario inference 
Range inter- or 
extrapolation 
Inference from in vitro 
to in vivo 
Surrogate Population 
Are the data from non-
human population?
OR
Are the data from a 
human population not 
specific enough?
Inference from animal 
to human 
Inference from general 
to sensitive population 
Note. If the answer is “yes” to the question, the arrow points to the next, more specific
category.
Judgment 
Variables
Hedging Conﬁdence Expert assumpon
Precauon Disagreement
Figure 2. The structure of the ontology of uncertainty based on judgment of
scientific experts.
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U.S. EPA between 2000 and 2010. Because a risk assessment document
often covers several hazards, each with its own scientific research and uncer-
tainties, our record was the document of a specific hazard, and reports cov-
ering more than one hazard were coded as if they were separate documents
effectively separating its content as if it were separate documents. Therefore,
our actual unit is the hazard document.
The documents range from one to over 600 pages with average of around
70 pages. They are official risk assessment reports written by a panel of
scientists.
Using ML
One straightforward strategy for the construction of an automated coding
system for these documents is to use supervised learning techniques. Super-
vised learning aims at finding rules starting from a set of training instances.
In our case, the training instances are the sentences (or small set of sentences)
and their associated labels given by human coders. The goal is to extract rules
that would allow a system to automatically label new sentences (or set of
sentences) drawn from documents similar to the one used by the human
coders. In our case, the system should be able to code a text input as “coded”
versus “noncoded” and, if coded, as one of the categories present in the
ontologies. Furthermore, if the learning system is trained from instances
drawn from different contexts, differences in the learned rules could be
enlightening about differences between these contexts. For instance, it could
appear that the rules learned from American documents differ somewhat
from the rules learned with documents from the EU because the documents
are produced by a different institutional contexts. Or that the rules of report-
ing may change over time.
In the estimation, we used naive Bayesian classifier, support vector
machines (SVMs), k-nearest neighbor, and decision tree algorithms (see
Flach 2012). The best overall learners were naive Bayes and SVM.
We started with the bag-of-words approach. We broke the sentences up
into words. We eliminated “stop words,” that is, words that were too com-
mon to be helpful such as “the,” “a,” “is,” and so on. Then, we stemmed the
words thus erasing the difference between, for instance, learning, learned,
learns, and so on. In our experiments, we removed 146 stop words and used
the Porter stemmer (see Perkins 2010; Porter 1980), yielding a final voca-
bulary of size 2,530.
At this point, one can adopt one of several existing numeric coding stra-
tegies. For instance, in the bag-of-words approach, each word present in a
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sentence can be associated with a 1 in the input vector and all the other,
absent, words with a 0. Or one can count the number of times this word is
present. For example, the sentence “In addition to the limitations al-ready
listed, there are also limitations introduced by the methods used to analyze
data inputs to the risk assessment” would become “addit limit alreadi list
limit introduc method analyz data input risk assess” after stop words have
been removed and after stemming. Then, it can be coded either with a 1 for
the feature “limit” or with a 2 since this stem appears twice in this sentence.
Other coding techniques involve the computation of relative frequencies
(e.g., tfidf for “term frequency/inverse document frequency”). Here we
report experiments with the 0/1 coding method.
Some algorithmic learners are, at the core, designed to separate two
classes. If one wants then to learn multiclass classification, for instance,
separating the three class “missing variables,” “surrogate context,” and
“sampling,” some scheme must be devised to turn two-class classification
rules into multiclass ones. In our experiments, we used the all-versus-all
technique (see Aly 2005).
It is a paradox that supervised learning is there to let us code very large
amounts of text but ML itself works well only when a large amount of text
for training and testing is already human coded. One problem when learn-
ing to separate data from different categories is that their frequency can be
significantly dissimilar (e.g., in our data, one sentence falls under the
“measure” category, while 71 fall under the “missing factors/variable
category”). If, for instance, one category is 10 times more highly repre-
sented than another one, a simple majority rule will yield a 90 percent
successful prediction rate without any learning taking place. In order to
circumvent this opportunistic but uninformative behavior, one method is
to balance class sizes. When the hand-coded data are plentiful, it is suf-
ficient to sample the overrepresented classes in order to reduce their size
to that of the least represented one. In our experiments, however, data are
already rather scarce as human coding is costly (having to read long and
difficult texts to affix the right code) and another technique had to be
used. For each underrepresented class, we chose to generate artificial data
points (sentences) by mixing the characteristics of existing data points
from this class. Specifically, we randomly drew two actual data points
(say, two different sentences coded to the same class or UV) and made up
an artificial data point (an artificial sentence or set of words) by retaining
for each feature either the one encountered in both actuals if they agreed
(common words) or by randomly choosing a value of one actual if they
disagreed on this feature.
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The data then were split into two halves. One half was the training set,
where the algorithm calculated the best fitting model, then it was tested on
the other half, the test set, to see how well it can reproduce human coding. In
order to measure the prediction performance, we used a fivefold cross-
validation technique (see Japkowicz and Shah 2011).
In this article, we will use recall, precision, and overall predictive power
to describe our results. Recall is the percentage of the observations (sen-
tences) in category k predicted as k by ML. These are the correct predictions
as percentage of cases actually in that category. Precision is the percentage of
cases predicted as being in k actually being in k. These are the correct
predictions as a percentage of predicting that category. The overall predictive
power is the correct predictions as a percentage of all the cases. Later, we will
also introduce a simple index to measure pairwise confusion.
Discussion
In this section, we will pose three questions, translate them to empirical
propositions, and discuss our results.
Can We Use ML to Assist With Coding Complex Documents on a
Difficult Topic Like Scientific Uncertainty?
Is ML doing a reasonable job overall in coding sentences? What features of
the text do we need to consider to maximize predictions? How are false
positives (sentences that are incorrectly put in a category) and false negatives
(sentences that are incorrectly left out of a category) distributed?
If ML is able to recognize and classify sentences with little error, it can be
useful to aid human coders. Coding risk assessment documents is, in certain
ways, an easier task than coding other types of texts such as blogs, novels, or
electronic mail. Scientific texts use a more standardized vocabulary than most
other documents, and they put a premium on clarity and explicit expression.
Risk assessments often follow a common format: introduction, hazard identi-
fication, dose–response assessment, exposure assessment and risk characteriza-
tion, and conclusion, and there is also often a summary in front. Scientists learn
how to write risk assessments, what each element should include, and so on.
Yet, coding expressions of uncertainty involves finding a set of meanings
that are quite complex. A single sentence or a set of contiguous sentences
may not carry the entire meaning, but the uncertainty is signaled by reference
to earlier parts of the text. Context can modify the meanings of entire
statements.
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Proposition 1.1: The more the method can incorporate complexities, the
better the tool is going to be.
The task involves complex meanings. Adding hypernyms, considerations
for context should improve our predictions over using just “bag of words.”
Cross-checking. Before we evaluated the performance of ML, we looked at the
errors ML made and went back to each case to see whether it was the
algorithm that erred or the human coder. One of the ways ML can help with
coding is by calling attention to human mistakes. Thus, ML learns from
human coders, and human coders can learn from ML. This is especially
important when the coding scheme is not a simple classification task where
a few preestablished categories have to be applied but a complex system that
is inductively developed and implemented in the same process.
There were 178 mismatched sentences where ML disagreed with human
coders. We reinspected each case individually, and we agreed with the
human coders in 87 percent and with ML in 6 percent of the cases. For
another 5 percent of the cases, both should have chosen a different UV, and
for rest, the sentences did not express uncertainty (essentially, human error).
There were also three cases where the same sentence had more than one
code. In two of those cases, the machine correctly attached one of the codes.
We corrected the human mistakes, and the final results were obtained on the
corrected set.
Results
Is ML doing a reasonable job overall? We looked at this in two steps. The
first step was to find whether a sentence was an expression of uncertainty or
judgment of ANY kind. Here we care more about recall than precision, as it
is better for the coders to get false positives (wrong suggestions for coding),
which the coders can simply override by looking at a smaller set of ML
suggestions, than false negatives (no suggestion where there should be one),
which force coders to scrutinize the entire document if they are to correct
them. The second step was to find the sentence’s code in an ontology, given
that it was an uncertainty expression.
Step 1. We began with the simplest approach, bag of words, using just the
stems of words in each sentence to predict whether the sentence is
coded or not. For JVs, SVM estimation gave the best results. Eighty-
four percent of the sentences were correctly identified as being coded
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for one of the five categories (Table 1). Recall was 80.6 percent, ML
failed to recognize one-fifth of the coded sentences.
For the UVs, ML was able to correctly identify 79.85 percent of the
sentences (Table 2). Here too, a fifth of the coded sentences went
unrecognized.
While ML is far from perfect, the results using the most primitive method
are surprisingly good. To further improve predictions, we tried to add more
complexity.
One idea was to recognize that what matters for assigning a sentence to a
category is not so much the words in the sentence but the meaning of the
word which can be expressed by synonyms that should be treated as the same
word, even though they “look” different. We tried to use WordNet (available
at http://wordnet.princeton.edu/), a large lexical database that groups nouns,
Table 1. The Success of Finding Sentences That Are Coded With the Judgment
Ontology.
Support Vector Machine Predicted
Coded as
Judgment Noncoded Recall
No. of
Elements
Actual Coded as judgment 378 91 80.60% 469
Not coded 70 474 87.13% 544
Precision 84.38% 83.89%
Total 1,013
Overall 84.11%
Table 2. The Success of Finding Sentences That Are Coded With the Uncertainty
Ontology.-
Support Vector Machine Predicted
Coded as
Uncertainty Noncoded Recall
No. of
Elements
Actual Coded as Uncertainty 447 108 80.54% 555
Non Coded 109 413 79.12% 522
Precision 80.40% 79.27%
Total 1,077
Overall 79.85%
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verbs, adjectives, and adverbs into sets of cognitive synonyms (synsets).
Using hypernyms, more general words covering a set of more specific words
(like using the word “fish” for “tuna,” “sardine,” or “swordfish”), we could
not improve our prediction. In fact, the proportion of correctly predicted UVs
fell by about 15 percent.
We also tried word sets assuming that the joint presence of certain words
may make a difference, and we modeled context by looking at the position of
a sentence in the conclusion. Neither of these improved our predictions. So
far, we have not seen any improvement by adding complexity, but we are not
ready to reject our first proposition. We will try other methods.
Step 2. How well was the ontology reproduced by ML once we knew the
sentence expressed uncertainty? For JVs, the best overall accuracy was
84.1 percent (Table 3). For UVs, it was 78.82 percent (Table 4).9
Can We Assess the Quality of the Ontology We Devised Using ML?
Can we say something about the quality and properties of our ontologies
using ML? If ML is doing a reasonable job coding sentences, can we test
various logical and semantic properties of our ontologies? Where does ML
work better and where does it work worse inside the ontologies?
Ontologies should be applicable in a consistent and reproducible manner.
Algorithms take consistency and reproducibility to a mechanical extreme.
Algorithms can spot human inconsistency. This inconsistency can be some
systematic weakness in the ontology that guides coders. By looking at the
patterns of errors of classification, what is called “confusion matrices,” we
can learn about the weaknesses of our ontologies and understand the cogni-
tive process behind coding. 10
JVs. Our ontology of the JVs is simple. As we did not elaborate the logical
connections, we have only semantic relationships among the five variables.
Confusion, therefore, will be driven by the compatibility of the connotations
of the variables.
Proposition 2.1: Categories that have opposite connotations will be less
likely to be confused.
Therefore, we would expect that hedgingwill be less likely to be confused
with confidence than with disagreement. Categories that have similar con-
notations will be more likely to be confused. Therefore, on the one hand,
hedging with disagreement, and on the other, confidence with expert
18 Sociological Methods & Research XX(X)
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assumption and precaution will be more likely to be confused. Some of these
confusions will arise from the fact that the same sentence is often coded by
more than one of the variables with similar connotations.
Results.We use pairwise confusion to measure the likelihood that category A
and B are confused with one another. Confusion is a symmetric measure that
is 0 when there is no confusion between a pair of categories and 1 when all
cases are misclassified as belonging to the other category.11
Pairwise confusion ¼ (fij þ fji)/(fij þ fji þ fii þ fjj), where fij is the number
of cases in category i predicted as being in category j.
Table 5 reveals that our proposition is wrong. The most confused vari-
ables are hedging and confidence. This is clearly unexpected. It turns out that
the source of the confusion is that we often find both in the same sentence.
Hedging clears the sentence for a following confident statement or modulates
confident pronouncements later.12
Hedging is also confused with precaution and expert assumption for the
same reason: hedging balances certitude. (Disagreement is too rare to analyze.)
UVs. For a hierarchical ontology such as the one we created for uncertainty, we
can compare errors in relationship with the distance among concepts in the
ontology. We can define distance between two concepts as the number of steps
it takes to reach from one concept to another following links in the hierarchy.
Proposition 2.2: In an ontology, confusions increase with closeness.
Variables that we find closer in the ontology (separated by fewer splits in
the tree/decisions) are more likely to be confused. Semantically close
Table 5. Confusion among Judgment Variables.
Predicted
Confidence Disagreement
Expert
Assumption
Hedged
Language Precaution
Actual Confidence .000 .022 .092 .007
Disagreement .000 .000 .000
Expert
assumption
.057 .055
Hedged
language
.070
Precaution
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variables have more similar meanings and thus are easier to confuse. An
ontology works better, if confusions increase with closeness, when big, more
general analytic distinctions are more clear and reliable.
Results. As shown in Table 4, we found variation in recall among the UVs.
The worst fit is missing factor/variables and limits of analytic methods,
followed by scenario inference and arbitrary assumptions. It is also inter-
esting that one would expect some types of uncertainties to be more common
and ritualized and thus better predicted. Inference from animal to human
(interspecies variation) and ontic uncertainty are both common and often
expressed in a common form.13
What can we say about which UVs are the easiest to confuse? Table 6
shows pairs with pairwise confusion larger than .05. Pairwise confusion rates
are fairly low. Of the top 13 pairs, missing factors/variables is part of six.
This seems to be the weakest part of our ontology. Because its root is
epistemic uncertainty, defined as “uncertainty that can be reduced by addi-
tional information,” it is easy to see why missing factors/variables is easy to
Table 6. The Pairs Most Confused.
Pair Distance Confusion
Missing factors/variables Limits of analytical methods 4 .122
Missing factors/variables Inference from one scenario to
another
4 .081
Nonrandom/
nonrepresentative
sample
Missing factors/variables 4 .079
Limits of analytical methods Comparability of data 3 .075
Ontic uncertainty/variability Limits of analytical methods 6 .075
Inference from one
scenario to an another
Arbitrary assumptions of values
used in the model
6 .071
Missing factors/variables Data 1 .063
Limits of analytical methods Epistemic uncertainty 4 .061
Missing factors/variables Arbitrary assumptions of values
used in the model
4 .058
Nonrandom/
nonrepresentative
sample
Comparability of data 5 .058
Ontic uncertainty/variability Comparability of data 5 .057
Ontic uncertainty/variability Epistemic uncertainty 2 .057
Missing factors/variables Comparability of data 3 .056
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confuse with anything in this branch. This is also the most common type of
uncertainty. It is followed by limits of analytical methods, the inadequacy of
scientific methods to reach a strong conclusion, and comparability of data,
both are one side of four pairs.
The highest level of confusion is between the pairs of missing factors/
variables and limits of analytic methods, inference from one scenario to
another and nonrandom/nonrepresentative sample.
To assess the correlation between distance and confusion, we first
weighted our data by the numbers of observations and eliminated pairs
where one of the variables had fewer than 5 observations or neither had
more than 10.14 The result shows that confusion is weakly but negatively
correlated with distance: The closer the two variables are, the more likely
they are to be confused.
We also ran a multiple regression of confusion on distance. We controlled
for the number of sentences observations each variable in the pair had. We
found the same, even stronger result: closeness increases confusion. Thus, we
found some evidence for Proposition 2.2a.
Does the Value of Our Ontologies Depend on Social Factors?
Can ML say anything about the circumstances that influence the perfor-
mance of our ontologies? Is the predictability of the categories a function
of the larger social context? As documents are social constructs, the success
of classification may not depend only on the powers of ML to find the best
algorithm, nor just on the cognitive and logical properties of the ontology,
but also on the social process that generated the documents.
We tested three such factors: time, institutions, and scientific cultures.
Thus, we compared earlier and later documents to see how learning and
increased awareness of the problem may had an effect. We also compared the
EU and the U.S. documents to search for larger institutional differences. And,
finally, we also contrasted documents discussing contaminants and biohazards
to see whether different scientific fields may articulate uncertainty differently.
We concentrated here only on the hierarchical uncertainty ontology.
Propositions 3.1: The more recent documents are better predicted overall
by ML.
This is a learning theory. Because panels that write risk assessments today
are more aware of the importance of explicitly expressing uncertainties than
those that wrote them a decade ago, and because panels developed a more
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standardized way of talking about uncertainty, we expect predictions
improve over time.
Proposition 3.2: The EU documents will be better predicted overall by
ML than those from the United States.
This is an institutional theory. Because in the EU risk assessment in food
safety is more centralized than in the United States and the RAs are more
standardized, European RAs will be easier to machine code. In the EU, the
vast majority of food safety risk assessments are written by panels of one
agency, EFSA, at the request of the European Commission, that then decides
on what, if any, action to take. In the United States, there are three principal
agencies in charge of this topic (U.S. FDA, USDA, and U.S. EPA), and each
can choose to use its own staff and in-house experts to generate risk assess-
ments or they can outsource it to outside experts or institutions. The rela-
tionship between food safety agencies and the food industry also varies
across the Atlantic. The U.S. agencies see their role more as balancing
between the interests of consumers and producers. In EFSA’s role, this
balancing is less explicit, and not answerable to any national industry of
government, it sees itself more as a neutral scientific enterprise.
Proposition 3.3: There will be a pattern of prediction that will be different
in the world of contaminants and biohazards.
This is a theory about different scientific cultures driven by their subject
matters and histories. We do see that the relative frequency of various uncer-
tainties differ across the two worlds. For example, contaminant research uses
experiments more frequently (animal experiments on biohazards are gener-
ally less useful), while biohazard research relies more on epidemiological
evidence. As a result, inference from animal to human is a bigger concern for
contaminants, while comparability of data and causal inference are more
common concern for biohazards. We also found that contaminant RAs tend
to be more specific about uncertainty than biohazards that tend to report more
epistemic uncertainty and missing variables/factors. Contaminant research is
more likely to point to ontic uncertainty and synergistic combination effect.
Proposition 3.3a: Overall contaminants will be better predicted because
contaminant RAs are more specific and explicit about uncertainties.
This is probably due to historical reasons. Contaminant research can draw
on older science (especially since many of the biohazards are novel zoonoses
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[hazards passed from animals to humans] such as BSE, avian flu, or new
strains of older viruses or bacteria).
Proposition 3.3b: Each field will be better predicted on issues that are
more central to that field because frequent concerns are expressed in a
more ritualized form.
Results. The overall fit for earlier RAs is not different than for later RAs. As is
seen in Figure 4, there is no learning.15 The three periods are virtually
identical. This rejects Proposition 3.1.
The overall fit for the EU is better than for the United States (Figure 5).
The difference is not large, but it supports Proposition 3.2.
79.88% 80.95% 80.00%
2000-2005 2006-2008 2009-2010
Figure 4. Predictive power of the hierarchical ontology over time.
81.61%
75.94%
SUUE
Figure 5. Predictive power of the hierarchical ontology in the European Union and
the United States.
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The overall fit for contaminants is less than 1 percent better than for
biohazards (Figure 6). This is small and not enough to lend support for
Proposition 3.3a.
There are some clear differences in the pattern of fit for the two fields of
food safety. There are a few UVs where the difference in recall is substantial
and there is sufficient number of cases for both fields. In the biohazard field,
epistemic uncertainty, missing factors/variables, limited analytic method,
arbitrary assumptions of values used in the model, and reporting are better
predicted. The first two have to do with the fact that biohazard deploys these
general expression more often.
In the contaminant field, causal inference, comparability of data, and
combination effect are predicted better. Combination effect, that two health
hazards act in concert one amplifying the effect of the other, is a common
concern for contaminants, but it is almost absent for biohazards. Therefore,
while we see differences between the fields, our Proposition 3.3b is not
supported.
Conclusion
In this article, we have demonstrated the value of enlisting the help of ML in
creating and deploying an ontology for the content analysis on a complex and
important topic, with significant policy implications. Explicit articulation of
uncertainty in science, especially in science involved in public policy,
improves science because it clarifies what future research is necessary, helps
policymakers to evaluate scientific reports, and reminds the public about the
limitations of current scientific knowledge.
79.78% 80.46%
MATNOCOIB
Figure 6. Predictive power of the hierarchical ontology for biohazards and con-
taminants overall.
26 Sociological Methods & Research XX(X)
We have built two complementary ontologies to measure the scientific
uncertainty expressed in food safety documents. We have used supervised
ML to help with three tasks. First, we want help with coding the thou-
sands of risk assessments in the United States and the EU. Our ontologies
were developed for food risk, but it has already been applied to environ-
mental risk and could easily be adopted in other areas. To make document
coding easier is a practical matter. In this article, we showed that
even with relatively simple methods, ML can do surprisingly well identi-
fying complex meanings and thus can be helpful making suggestions to
human coders.
Second, ML can aid us to evaluate our coding practices and our ontol-
ogies. We found that our ontologies enable a fairly consistent practice of
coding. Evaluating our ontology of judgment, we learned that elements of
judgment are often communicated in relationship to one another. In our
future work, we will try to exploit these relationships to identify JVs.
Assessing our ontology of uncertainty, we found out that the deductive
decision-making process, that aids human coders, and that is reflected in
the hierarchical structure of our ontology, makes the first large cuts fairly
well and confusions tend to emerge between variables that our system
defines as being closer.
Third, we wanted to use ML to get insights into the causal processes of
making uncertainty explicit. We found some evidence that institutional fac-
tors may influence the consistency with which uncertainty is expressed. We
also found some indication that scientific cultures by encountering forms of
uncertainties with different frequencies articulate uncertainties differently.
This warns us that ontology building must be sensitive to the larger social
context of the topic it intends to map.
One must know a lot about how texts are structured, produced, and what
their contents are before the machine help can be enlisted. One has to
understand the nature of the documents and its relationship to the question
one is interested in to decide whether unsupervised ML is an option at all.
Even if unsupervised techniques are warranted, human judgment plays a
role in selecting the corpus and then interpreting and validating the results.
With supervised learning, as we have demonstrated, machine and humans
work together. After selecting the texts, humans must develop an ontology,
the machines can help testing and, if needed, improving the classification
scheme. Then, the machine can scale up human coding on its own with
humans taking samples to check the quality of the machine’s decisions or
machines can be used to aid and speed up coding by providing suggestions
to human coders.
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Notes
1. This usage of the word “ontology” is very far from its much more general
philosophical meaning of the study of nature of being.
2. Our ontology has been adopted in the field of environmental safety.
3. Contaminants are any substance, such as arsenic, cadmium or lead, not inten-
tionally added to food which is present as a result of the production, manufacture,
or other steps while holding food or as a result of environmental contamination.
Biological hazards include pathogenic viruses, bacteria, and prions that cause
bovine spongiform encephalopathy.
4. A detailed description of these ontologies including the codebook with defini-
tions and examples can be found at the website of the HolyRisk Project: http://
www6.inra.fr/holyrisk.
5. When a sentence contains multiple expressions of uncertainty, each is repre-
sented by different phrases or clauses. Therefore, in principle, at least in some
cases we could break up those sentences and pick out the words relevant to each.
6. Apart from the presence or absence of the expression of a category in a sentence,
we also coded the intensity of the expression, data we don’t present here because
in many cases it proved to be impossible to ascertain gradations.
7. Lakoff’s original article that set off research on hedges makes the claim that
making propositions fuzzier is actually making them more accurate because the
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world is fuzzy and truth is a matter of degree. Hedges allow us to move beyond
the stark and misconceived binary distinction between truth and untruth.
8. The literature attempts to classify hedges depending on how it deals with uncer-
tainty, whether it serves to protect the author, or whether it just indicates that
information is incomplete or that the validity or reliability of the proposition is
not fully accepted. We did not make these distinctions.
9. We dropped three variables from the analysis because we did not have enough
observations for model fitting and testing. Those are model, sampling, and
measure.
10. The errors assume that we correctly decided whether to code a sentence and the
calculations are based on sentences correctly identified as uncertainty
expressions.
11. When there are only two categories, the overall fit ¼ 1  confusion.
12. Mushin (2001) calls these “uncertainty sandwiches.”
13. We would expect both to be better predicted and they are not. When we look at
the most frequent words, the words that one would expect to be most strongly
associated with those two uncertainty variables (animal, human, inter, species
and intra, species, and variability) are on the list, but they are not the most
frequent ones.
14. More common variables tend to have higher recall error and higher pairwise
confusion rates.
15. In Figures 4, 5, and 6 the left axis starts at 50 percent.
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